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The Court-Martial of Jefferson Davis

By James A. Beckman

Could a drink of grog or the casual association of a young college student with a jovial tavern keeper have changed the course of American history? You bet. Cadet Jefferson Davis had both, and the ramifications that flowed from these activities in 1825 would come precariously close to altering the course of his life and, perhaps, that of this country. As most students of American history are aware, Jefferson Davis attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point from 1824 to 1828. Many do not know, however, that the future American soldier, congressman, senator, secretary of war, and president of the Confederacy was court-martialed and convicted at West Point in 1825 for drinking "spirituous" and "intoxicating" liquors[1] and being present at an off-limits tavern not far from the academy. The court sentenced him to be dismissed. His whole future hung in the balance during the bleak month of August 1825 as War Department officials pondered whether to execute that sentence. This article briefly chronicles this little-known incident in the life of Jefferson Davis.

Within a year of arriving at the academy, the yearling (i.e., sophomore) Cadet Jefferson Davis had become acquainted with West Point's notorious tavern keeper, Benjamin J. Havens, popularly known among his large cadet clientele as "Benny." Mirroring in life such fictional tavern keepers as Shakespeare's Falstaff and Victor Hugo's Thenardier, Benny Havens served as the provider of liquors, viands, raucous times, tavern escapades, and other off-limits delights to the cadets at West Point for most of the U.S. Military Academy's first half century. It was Davis's relationship with Benny that would cause Davis so much trouble in August 1825.[2]

Jefferson Davis's problems with Benny Havens first began on the rainy summer night of 31 July 1825. Davis had survived unscathed through his first year at the academy, classes were now over, and he was engaged in his summer field encampment on what is today the parade field at West Point. That night a heavy rain inundated the flat encampment grounds and flooded the tents of Davis and the other cadets around him. As Davis later explained, he was at that point "at a loss to know what to do" and began to wander around the grounds. Whether Jeff Davis intended to seek out Benny is unclear, as Davis later admitted only that he had wandered "too far."[3] However, for whatever reasons, Cadet Davis and his companions made a two-mile trek to Benny's abode and tavern and were soon

Jefferson Davis as a Young Man
(Image courtesy of Louisiana State University Press)

thereafter warming themselves by Benny's fireside, drinking porter and hard cider.

In 1824–1825, Benny was just concluding his first decade as West Point's main (and most infamous) tavern keeper. To the cadets, and most certainly to young Jeff Davis, Benny was known as a clandestine supplier of libations and homemade foods, for the Army had placed off-limits to cadets any establishment where "spirituous or intoxicating liquor" was sold.[4] Because Benny's establishment was off-limits, "running it" to Benny Havens' became a sport for a half-century of West Point cadets. Benny specialized in buckwheat cakes and roast turkey cooked by his wife. Otherwise, the menu was described as being almost exclusively beef prepared in almost every form imaginable: boiled, roasted, baked, cold, and sliced, and sometimes even reduced to beef soup. In addition to the food, Benny offered the typical assortment of tavern beverages, including his own famous concoction, "hot flip," a combination of ale or cider with eggs well beaten in, sweetened, spiced, and heated by the coals of the fire. It is no wonder that cadets loved Benny and were attracted to his tavern. After all, the options were the bland food provided by the academy or the delicious homemade food provided by Mrs. Havens. Perhaps this is why Edgar Allan Poe, one of Benny's earliest noted patrons, reportedly once remarked that Benny was "the only congenial soul in the entire God-forsaken place."[5]

It is unclear whether Jeff Davis specifically sought out this congenial soul on that rainy July night because of his thirst and appetite, or whether he really did merely wander "too far" in search of shelter. What is clear is that Jeff Davis and his compatriots did end up at the establishment of Benny Havens, a good two miles from the boundaries of the academy, and promptly commenced refreshing themselves with Benny's wares. Much to the chagrin of the adventuresome cadets, however, their tactical officer was not far behind them in their trek to Benny Havens'. As Davis and others had missed a formation after the rain subsided, their tactical officer initiated a search for the wayward cadets. Capt. Ethan Allen Hitchcock must have been a fairly astute gentleman, for he started his search by going directly to the off-limits establishment run by Mr. Havens. Captain Hitchcock undoubtedly knew the way to Benny's tavern, as many staff officers at West Point also went to Benny's on occasion for dinner or a drink. As Hitchcock entered the front door, he encountered Davis and four other Southern cadets, all in various degrees of intoxication and merriment. While several of the cadets had drinks in front of them, Jeff Davis did not. Davis apparently tried to explain that the cadets were at Benny's tavern because a rainstorm had flooded their tents and they had wandered to Benny's only in search of shelter.

Captain Hitchcock did not believe the cadets and was wholly unimpressed with what he presumably thought to be a very convenient explanation regarding their presence at Benny's tavern. Thus, Davis and the other four cadets were arrested the following day by the post provost marshal and brought before a court-martial convened two days after the incident, on 2 August 1825. Jefferson Davis thus became one of the first cadets court-martialed for imbibing at Benny's tavern. He was specifically charged as follows:

Charge 1st. Violating the 1415th paragraph of the General Army Regulations.

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Specification. In this—that the said Cadet Davis did, on Sunday, the 31st of July, 1825, go beyond the limits prescribed to Cadets at West-Point, without permission.

Charge 2d. Violating the 1408th paragraph of the General Army Regulations.

Specification 1st. In this—that the said Cadet Davis, on Sunday the 31st of July, 1825, at some place in the vicinity of West Point, did drink spirituous and intoxicating liquor.

Specification 2d. In this—that the said Cadet Davis, on Sunday, the 31st of July, 1825, did go to a public house or place were spirituous liquors are sold, kept by one Benjamin Havens, at or near Buttermilk Falls, and distant about two miles from the Post of West-Point.[5]

As was typical at West Point in those days, Cadet Davis was responsible for his own defense. At the court-martial, Davis first appeared as a witness for one of the other charged cadets, Theophilus Mead of Virginia. On direct examination, Cadet Davis testified that he had never seen Cadet Mead "drink spirits" at any time during the preceding year, despite the fact that Captain Hitchcock had caught Mead with a glass of port wine in his hands. When cross-examined, Davis refused to answer certain questions on the grounds that his answers would incriminate him. The next day, however, Cadet Davis elaborated on his obviously inconsistent testimony by admitting that Cadet Mead probably did drink wine and cider at Benny's tavern that evening. Davis explained that he did not consider wine or cider to be "spirituous liquors" within the meaning of the Academy's regulations.

Soon after Cadet Davis provided this clarification, it came time for his own case-in-chief. Davis decided to employ a defense based upon a strict, literal interpretation of existing regulations and what he thought the terms of the regulations meant. First, Davis argued that while cadets generally knew they should not visit Benny Havens', no official order prohibited such visits. Actually, this was an incorrect assertion, as paragraph 1408 of the *General Regulations for the Army*, under which he was charged, clearly prohibited such visits. Davis soon conceded this point, but he argued that cadets were unaware of the regulation—in essence contending that ignorance of the law was a legitimate

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

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defense. Davis also argued that his conduct in going off post to Benny's tavern should be excused on account of the harsh weather.

In light of Captain Hitchcock's testimony that he saw Davis in Benny's tavern, these arguments did not sway the court, whose presiding officer was Bvt. Maj. William J. Worth, the commandant of cadets. A hero of the War of 1812 who had not attended the academy, Major Worth was nicknamed "Haughty Bill" by the cadets because of his ever-present military poise and "spit-and-polish" appearance.[7] Thus, Cadet Davis pled guilty to going to Benny's establishment very early in his defense. However, Davis would not admit that he had imbibed any "spirituous liquors" within the meaning of the regulations and put on a vigorous defense on these grounds. Davis focused on the testimony for the prosecution presented by Captain Hitchcock. While Hitchcock testified that he saw Davis at Benny Havens', Hitchcock could-not say that he actually saw Cadet Davis take a drink or even that a drink was situated in proximity to Davis. Davis was not completely effective in his cross-examination of Captain Hitchcock, however, as Hitchcock reasserted that Davis had the appearance of one who had been drinking.

In his summation, Cadet Davis indicated that he felt "the greatest embarrassment" at having to defend himself in a court-martial. Davis then launched into the main theme of his closing argument: fairness. Davis contended that it would be unfair to hold him accountable under a regulation that he did not know existed at the time of the infraction. In Davis's eyes, holding him accountable would be akin to an *ex post facto* prosecution. Davis also reminded the panel of what he thought were mitigating circumstances, namely that he had been forced out of his tent by a torrential downpour and that he had only sought shelter from the elements at Benny's abode. Davis concluded his oration by reminding the court of "the maxim that it is better that a hundred guilty should escape than one rightuous [*sic*] person be condemned."[8]

Needless to say, however, neither Davis's eloquence nor his strict, literal interpretation of the regulations completely swayed the court. Instead, the court convicted Cadet Davis on all charges and sentenced him to be dismissed, but it recommended the remission of his sentence on the basis of his earlier good conduct. That evening Davis was again put under arrest, and one can imagine that he spent the evening pondering how his family and friends would take his dismissal from the Military Academy. Davis would remain under arrest for much of the month of August 1825 and was in very low spirits throughout. Fortunately for Davis, however, the two most prominent officers involved in his court-martial proceedings, both of whom were noted for their sound military judgment, intervened on his behalf. Captain Hitchcock, his tactical officer and chief accuser, and Major Worth, the officer who presided over his court-martial, pleaded with the academy's superintendent, Bvt. Lt. Col. Sylvanus Thayer, to overturn the panel's sentence in light of Davis's redeeming soldierly skills.[9] Colonel Thayer acquiesced and supported leniency for Cadet Davis in this case. The court-martial's recommendation not to separate Davis was subsequently approved by Secretary of War James Barbour, a former senator from Virginia. Thus, Davis narrowly averted separation, while three fellow cadets who were apprehended with him at Benny Havens' tavern were dismissed.

Colonel Thayer would apparently regret this decision. Writing in 1855 to engineer Capt. George Cullum, Thayer expressed strong views about Davis, who was then serving as secretary of war: "Neither he nor my opinion of him has changed since I knew him as a cadet. If I am not deceived, he intends to leave his mark in the Army & also at West Point & a *black* mark it will be I fear. He is a recreant & unnatural son, would have pleasure in giving his Alma Mater a kick & would disown her, if he could."[10]

One of the questions this incident raises is whether Jefferson Davis learned from this experience. Cadet Davis's subsequent Academy record tells us "no." Despite his near dismissal, Jeff Davis could not long resist the temptations offered by the nearby tavern. Thus, it was only a matter of time before he was back sharing drinks and food with Benny. On one of these subsequent visits in August 1826, an announcement was made within the tavern that a tactical officer was quickly approaching the premises. Perhaps thinking that his academy career was now in serious jeopardy, in light of the fact he had been court-martialed and found guilty of the same offense one year before, Davis and a fellow cadet dashed out Benny's back door and began running back to the academy along a cliff above the Hudson. Because of the darkness (and perhaps the

alcohol), Davis tripped and fell over the cliff, plummeting toward the rocks on the shore of the Hudson. Fortunately for young Jeff, some trees broke his fall on the way down. His companion peered over the edge and yelled, "Jeff, are you dead?" Davis wanted to laugh but was in too much pain to do so. The future Confederate president "tore his hands dreadfully" attempting to break his fall and was hospitalized for months. His doctors initially thought that he "was about to die."[11]

Not long after Cadet Davis recuperated from his injuries, and perhaps even before he was fully recuperated, he once again found himself in trouble in an incident that involved alcohol and Benny Havens and once again could have faced expulsion. On Christmas Eve 1826, less than a year and a half after his court-martial, Jefferson Davis was at it again, this time taking part in what certainly could be classified as one of the most infamous cadet drinking parties in West Point history. This was a grand eggnog party that began late on 24 December 1826 and continued into the early morning hours of Christmas Day. Jeff Davis appears to have been one of several cadets who were responsible for planning the event. During the day, a number of cadets made a trip to Havens to buy the required alcohol and sneak it back to the barracks. Once back, the drinks were concocted, and by 1 A.M. on Christmas Day, the party had started in earnest. However, like many parties that take place on college campuses, one thing soon led to another. By 4 A.M. the party was in such high swing that Captain Hitchcock was aroused by the commotion and decided to investigate. When the captain arrived at Room No. 5 in the North Barracks, the site of the party, Jefferson Davis had stepped out, apparently to invite more cadets. Having learned that Captain Hitchcock was up, Davis returned to the room proclaiming "Boys, put away that grog. Capt[ain] Hitchcock is coming." We can once again imagine what might have raced through Davis's mind the next moment, when he turned and stood face-to-face with Captain Hitchcock.[12]

Fortunately for young Jeff Davis, he then obeyed the most important order in his young life, going back to his barracks room at Captain Hitchcock's command and promptly falling asleep. Not long afterward, other cadets would refuse similar orders and, worse still, would physically resist the efforts of the tactical officers to stop the partying. In the melee that followed, drunken cadets struck Captain Hitchcock and other officers with pieces of wood and furniture, smashed windows, and destroyed property. At one point, Cadet Walter B. Guion of Mississippi, a roommate of Cadet Davis's, discharged his pistol at Captain Hitchcock. Fortunately for all concerned, the pistol misfired.

In the aftermath of this party gone amok, Colonel Thayer immediately ordered the convening of a court of inquiry, again presided over by Major Worth. The court called almost every cadet in the corps to testify, including Davis, and identified some seventy cadets who were in one fashion or another involved in the party and riots. Of these, Thayer decided to court-martial the nineteen cadets most deeply involved in the melee. All nineteen were ultimately convicted, and the court-martial sentenced them all to be separated for their misconduct. In reviewing the proceedings, President John Quincy Adams approved the immediate dismissal or resignation of twelve of the nineteen cadets, including Guion's, but revoked seven sentences based upon clemency recommendations. It is interesting to ponder whether Jeff Davis realized how close he had once again come to dismissal as one of the core planners of the drinking party that led to the melee. Davis had averted a court-martial this time based upon testimony before the court of inquiry that he had gone to his room and fallen asleep and had not participated in the rioting. He clearly had not taken part in either the physical assaults upon the officers or the destruction of academy property.

Despite these various incidents, Jeff Davis remained a loyal friend and customer of Benny Havens for the remainder of his academy career. Even as late as the mid-1850s, when Davis returned to West Point to inspect the academy in his capacity as secretary of war, he thought it important to stop by Benny Havens' for a drink and a friendly word. It is somewhat ironic that Davis, when charged with reviewing the Academy's fitness, chose to visit his dear old friend Benny, the tavern keeper who could be said to be partially responsible for Davis's court-martial and disciplinary troubles in August 1825, his nearly fatal fall in August 1826, and the "eggnog" riot of December 1826.[13]

Of course, after his graduation in July 1828, Jeff Davis went on to what can conservatively be characterized as an impressive career in public service. How-

ever, it does not require much imagination to ponder how American history might have changed if Jefferson Davis had been separated from the academy as the result of his court-martial conviction. At a minimum, his court-martial had to be one of the defining moments of his young life, with his entire academic, military, and future political viability potentially hanging in the balance. Knowledge of this incident helps the student of American history to gain a little fuller picture of the life and times of Jefferson Davis.

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NOTES

1. Haskell M. Monroe and James T. McIntosh, eds., *The Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 9 vols. to date (Baton Rouge, 1971–), 1: 37, 40–41.
2. Benny Havens (1787–1877) first appeared at the newly founded Military Academy in 1802–1803 as a carpenter. Soon thereafter, he began sporadically and surreptitiously providing alcoholic beverages to cadets. By 1812 Benny was running a tavern at West Point full time, and he would continue to serve as a tavern keeper until his death. For more detail about Benny Havens, his tavern, and the escapades of several generations of cadets who visited it, see my forthcoming article, "With Room Enough, Beside Our Graves: The Story of Benny Havens," that will appear soon in *Assembly*.
3. The minutes of Davis's August 1825 court-martial are printed in Monroe and McIntosh, *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1: 35–44. The quoted words are on p. 40.
4. *General Regulations for the Army* (Washington, 1825), p. 384, para. 1408.
5. Robert J. Wood, "The Early Days of Benny Havens," *The Pointer* 14 (26 February 1937): 6–8, with the quotation on p. 6; John C. Waugh, *The Class of 1846 from West Point to Appomattox: Stonewall Jackson, George McClellan, and Their Brothers* (New York, 1994), p. 38.
6. Monroe and McIntosh, *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1: 36–37.
7. John Crane and James Kieley, *West Point: "The Key to America"* (New York, 1947), pp. 115–16; Thomas J. Fleming, *West Point: The Men and Times of the United States Military Academy* (New York, 1969), p. 45.
8. Monroe and McIntosh, *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1: 39–40.
9. George Pappas, *To The Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802–1902* (Westport, Conn., 1993), p. 161; Fleming, *West Point*, p. 56.
10. Pappas, *To the Point*, p. 161.
11. Varina Davis describes this incident in her biography of her husband, *Jefferson Davis, Ex-President of the Confederate States of America: A Memoir by His Wife*, 2 vols. (New York, 1890), 1: 52, containing the first quotation; see also Monroe and McIntosh, *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1: 53–54, with the second quotation on p. 53; Fleming, *West Point*, p. 56.
12. On the eggnog party and its aftermath, see Monroe and McIntosh, *Papers of Jefferson Davis*, 1: 55–84, 99, with the quoted words on p. 75; Pappas, *To the Point*, pp. 169–74; Fleming, *West Point*, p. 58.
13. Ltr, Mrs. George White Potter to Maj Gen Thomas H. Barry, Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, 21 Jul 1911, in Benny Havens file, Special Collections Department, U.S. Military Academy Library.

Philippine Scouts Historical Materials

The Philippine Scouts Heritage Society requests the donation to the Fort Sam Houston Museum of materials that could help depict the history of the Philippine Scouts, which served in the U.S. Army for forty-five years beginning in 1901. Information about that museum's Philippine Scouts collections and about how to make a donation to them may be obtained by writing to the museum's curator, John Manguso, at the Fort Sam Houston Museum, ATTN: MCCS-BRL-MM, 1210 Stanley Road, Fort Sam Houston, Texas 78234-5002; by phoning him at (210) 221-1886, or by sending an electronic message to *john.manguso@amedd.army.mil.*

THE CHIEF'S CORNER

John Sloan Brown

It is hard to believe that I have been Chief of Military History for a year. Time does go by fast when one is having fun! Looking back on 1999, I am pleased to report continuing progress in implementing the Army Historical Program Strategic Plan 2010. Let us look at each of the major focus areas in turn.

Our INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY focus area is intended to provide on-demand interactive access to military history, artifact data, and source documentation. The Center of Military History (CMH) website (*www.army.mil/cmh-pg*) continues to expand its holdings while sustaining the quality that has already won it several academic awards for excellence. Our latest effort is a Digitization Initiative to identify and prioritize web-worthy candidates from our vast holdings of source materials. We will start with our collection of letters issued by The Adjutant General from 1921 to the present and then work through other collections as resources permit. On a related note, check out our virtual tour of the Fort Myer Museum, intended to be the first of many. We are working hard to make the Army Historical Program fully accessible to those touring cyberspace.

The focus of PRODUCTS and SERVICES is to assure that customers receive timely, accurate, and comprehensive historical information and services. I have recently approved the Historical Projects Development Process (HPDP), an initiative a year in the making, which will standardize our approach to all CMH projects requiring over 90 man-days or $20,000. This should render us even better able to optimize scarce resources while also dealing with the short term "fire missions" of Congressional, Secretariat, and Army Staff inquiries. For more information on the HPDP, contact MAJ Lee Torres, the CMH Executive Officer, at (202) 685-2714.

The OUTREACH focus area intends that we be proactive and responsive in making potential customers aware of historical products and services. Our efforts in this regard have begun to crystallize around an American Military Heritage Initiative, intended to be announced with some fanfare on the Army's 225th Birthday, 14 June 2000. Components of the initiative will include a "cargo pocket" history of the United States Army; a review of programs of instruction for military heritage education; a revision of our *American Military History*, hopefully with input from all of you; a Military Heritage Reading List promulgated by the Chief of Staff; and related efforts to deepen the appreciation of history throughout the Army and beyond. For more information on the American Military Heritage Initiative, contact Dr. Andrew Birtle at (202) 685-2278.

The EDUCATION focus area assists the entire Army in thinking in historical context. In a lively and productive session, the Military History Coordinating Committee—representing CMH, TRADOC, AWC, CSI, and USMA—achieved consensus concerning much of the way ahead in this regard. Again, we have high hopes for the American Military Heritage Initiative and hope to see it play out well with respect to EDUCATION as well. As always, the Army Museum System and the CMH website have important roles to play in this effort.

Effective PROGRAM MANAGEMENT would see all of us in the Army historical community collaborate with, coordinate with, and support one another. I believe we are seeing this happen and call your attention to the recently published *Army Historical Program, Fiscal Year 2000*, to make the point. We can be similarly pleased with the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee's (DAHAC) findings, to be published separately, which offer us very useful insights pointing toward further achievement.

I hope that you, as I, find all this progress in implementing the Army Historical Program Strategic Plan 2010 helpful and encouraging. We do look forward to hearing from you on how we can implement it better and on the progress you too are making.

Wood for Warfare
American Forestry Soldiers in Action
By Troy D. Morgan

American warfare has required an enormous amount of lumber, and U.S. Army forestry engineers have provided much of the Army's needs. Lumber products have gone into foxholes, bunkers, buildings, bridge and dock pilings, railroad ties, and firewood. Cost and time have often made it impossible to import these items from the United States. When lumber is brought from outside a theater, its transportation is often delayed by more critically needed items such as ammunition, food, medical supplies, and repair parts. Once in country, the wood products have faced the same transportation battle, as supplies of greater need are rushed forward and the lumber piles up in rear areas.

Lumber is a something of a luxury. While combat troops find it helpful in the defense and in some forms (e.g., bridge pilings and telephone poles) vital to the offense, they will find a way to fight and win without lumber. Lumber is essential, however, to morale. It can mean the difference between a muddy floor in a tent or a clean, dry place to rest.

Whenever possible the Army has deployed forestry engineers, but just like the lumber they produce there are never enough of these men. The skills of lumbermen take time to learn, their machinery is complex and cumbersome, and their work is difficult and dangerous.

Several volunteer engineer regiments were raised during the Civil War, but they performed general engineer support. Few specialty units were formed. Units that required lumber for a project were responsible for its procurement. During the Atlanta campaign General Sherman's engineers built seven trestle bridges across the Chattahoochee River, using trees that lined the bank. Engineer detachments were sent to fell the trees and transport them to the river so they could be used in the construction of the bridges. The engineers also built ten pontoon bridges across that waterway.[1]

Occasionally, units operated private sawmills. Company E, 1st Regiment of Missouri Volunteer Engineers, operated the mill of Mr. S. A. Ballinger in Waverly, Tennessee, for seventy-seven days at a cost of one dollar per day.[2] Other mills belonging to Confederate supporters would just be seized and operated without compensation.

In 1898 the United States declared a war with Spain it was not ready to fight. Before the U.S. Army could deploy to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, new staging areas, camps, and training ranges had to be built. While the Army raised no true forestry units during the Spanish-American War, several engineer regiments served in lumber procurement, production, and distribution roles. For example, the 2d Regiment of U.S. Volunteer Engineers was tasked with providing construction support at Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point, New York, the post to which most soldiers serving in Cuba and Puerto Rico would return for quarantine.[3]

The work at Camp Wikoff received sufficiently high priority for Secretary of War Russell Alger to visit there in late August 1898 and to confer directly with the commander of the 2d Volunteer Engineers, Col. Willard Young. Lumber was a critical factor in the construction work at Camp Wikoff. Colonel Young reported to the camp's commander, "There was not enough lumber on hand at any one time to supply all the demands made of it." The shortage of lumber was complicated by the way it was shipped. Lumber arrived at the camps in boxcars that had to be emptied diagonally through the narrow doors. This made offloading difficult. Young reported, "Not more than four men can advantageously work at one time unloading one of the cars." Once out of the railcars, the lumber had to be loaded on wagons and transported to the construction project.[4]

At Camp Wikoff, the lumber shortage was so severe that on 25 August 1898 the installation commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, relieved the post quartermaster of the responsibility for its distribution and gave the task to the 2d Volunteer Engineers, which had received the most important building assignments. Between 25 August and 15 September, the engineers filled 1,479 wagons with wood from waiting railcars. Their diligence, planning, and hard work turned a shortage into a surplus. Various

Sawmill at Camp Brookings near Landres, France, December 1918
(Signal Corps photo by Sgt. F. T. Morris)

units employed over 1.4 million board feet of lumber at the camp, more than a third of it for hospital construction.[5]

In Cuba, the U.S. Army's shortage of lumber was compounded by a shortage of firewood. At least initially, most of the firewood used by U.S. occupation troops in Cuba was purchased from Cuban dealers. This fuel was expensive and had to be transported from the interior of the island by cart or train.[6]

Soon after the United States entered World War I in 1917, it became obvious that in this war being fought in trenches across the French countryside American troops would require large amounts of wood products. Recognizing the importance of forestry engineers, General Pershing informed the War Department that it would be unwise to send fighting troops to France before an adequate supply of lumber could be assured. Lumbermen, he argued, should be among the first troops sent overseas.[7]

In response to this pressing need, the U.S. Forest Service recruited the 10th Engineers (Forestry) in the summer of 1917. This was the first unit ever raised with the specific mission of lumber procurement and distribution. The insatiable need for wood in the trenches necessitated the rapid expansion of the forestry engineers. On 18 October 1918, the various U.S. Army forestry units in France were reorganized into the 20th Engineers (Forestry). By the Armistice, the 20th operated 81 sawmills producing over 2 million board feet of lumber daily.[8]

The 20th Engineers was the largest regiment to serve in World War I. Its 18,500 troops were organized into 14 battalions, 49 forestry companies, and 28 engineer service companies. Another 10,000 quartermaster troops supported the engineer forestry regiment. By the time of its redeployment to the states, the 20th and its elements had produced over 200 million board feet of lumber and 300,000 cords of firewood. Although some wood was imported or purchased from French dealers, the forestry units' contribution represented over 75 percent of all lumber and ties and over 90 percent of all firewood used by the American Expeditionary Forces in France.[9]

The 10,000 supporting quartermaster troops were organized into 12 labor battalions, 15 pack trains, 3 wagon companies, and 1 motor truck company. Most of these troops were African Americans. Quartermaster and engineer service troops under the direction of forestry supervisors produced most of the firewood in the theater.[10]

World War II brought the U.S. Army to an unprecedented size and complexity. By 1945 roughly 8.3 million men and women were serving in the Army in the defense of the United States.[11] The need for lumber and other wood products for this huge force placed an unbearable strain on the American forestry industry. In addition to the units fighting overseas that needed lumber, dozens of new camps were built across the country to train American soldiers.

In June of 1941 the Army's Engineer Board investigated the feasibility of activating forestry companies. The board hired a civilian expert, E. E. Esgate, to study the proposal. He concluded that extensive construction within the theater of operations would create an insatiable demand for lumber. Despite this conclusion, it took the Army until June 1942 to activate its first forestry companies in World War II.[12]

The 800th Engineer Forestry Company was one of the companies activated in June 1942. Over half the company's enlisted men had prior forestry experience, and almost all the officers were lumbermen. Learning from its experience in the First World War, the Army recruited men with forestry backgrounds to lead these units. The commander of the 800th, Capt. Horace Erikson, typified these officers. He had graduated from the University of Connecticut's School of Forestry and had been an employee of the U.S. Forest Service before volunteering for military duty.[13]

The 800th was one of sixteen forestry companies raised by the U.S. Army during World War II. It served in Italy, where it managed as many as fifty sawmills. Many of these mills were small, water-powered rigs capable of producing only 1,000 board feet per day. The detachment of the 800th commanded by 1st Lt.

A D–8 Caterpillar tractor powers a makeshift sawmill along the Alcan Highway, 1942
(Signal Corps photo)

Lumber camp operated by the 800th Engineer Forestry Company in the Sila Mountains in Calabria, Italy, April 1944
(Signal Corps photo)

Marion C. Leach operated four sawmills between 22 December 1944 and 16 June 1945. As this detachment had only the one officer and forty enlisted men, the mills employed primarily inexperienced enlisted men from the 338th Engineer General Service Regiment and over 500 prisoners of war.[14]

True to form, the U.S. Army found itself unprepared for the Korean War. The troops in Korea needed wood products, but ammunition, equipment, and reinforcements had a higher priority. In Korea, most of the trees had already been removed from the southern half of the country, and little lumber was available initially. Creative procurement, or "scrounging" as the GIs called it, became the key to successful operations.

The construction of a bridge across the Nam River at Chinju in September 1950 by Capt. Richard McAdoo's Company A, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, was typical of early engineer operations in Korea. Captain McAdoo faced 300 feet of river and had only 200 feet of bridge. A reconnaissance party sent downstream uncovered some discarded steel pilings and a large stockpile of heavy timbers. With the freshly liberated timbers, the 65th in twenty hours put a bridge across the Nam River that sustained IX Corps' drive toward the west and north.[15]

In contrast to the Korean road network, the Korean National Railroad was a modern transportation system capable of moving large quantities of supplies in a timely manner. The fact that no wooden trestle bridges had existed on this system prior to the Korean War testified to the poor quality of local trees and the difficulty of driving piles into Korean streambeds. When Army engineers began repairs on the railroad bridge across the Han River at Tanyang, they needed to build 60-foot-high piers. As an expedient, the

engineers constructed hollow cribs using thousands of railroad ties salvaged from spur lines.[16]

Once armistice talks opened in Panmunjom, the Korean War began to resemble the trench warfare of World War I. Trenches, bunkers, and command posts all consumed large amounts of lumber, and it was initially impossible to import enough to meet the need. While the more stationary nature of the later stages of the conflict allowed lumber to flow forward to the units at the front, shortages persisted. The 11th Engineer Combat Battalion started operating a portable sawmill to relieve some of the backlog of lumber orders. This mill stayed in operation well after the war's conclusion.

While Vietnam contained many exotic hardwood species, no forestry units served there during the U.S. Army's long commitment in that country. Some Army engineers expressed an interest in setting up a sawmill in a forest across the bay from the U.S. Army's large logistical base at Cam Ranh Bay, but the Army chose not to pursue this proposal as the area was a Viet Cong stronghold. All lumber products used by the U.S. Army in Vietnam were imported from other countries. Many Asian nations provided lumber, since Asian wood imports were cheaper than those coming from the United States. It was thus not uncommon in Vietnam to see concrete forms made of Philippine mahogany plywood.[17]

Today the proud history of the U.S. Army forestry engineers lives on in Detachment 2 of the 6015th Garrison Support Unit. This detachment functions as an engineer forestry unit, using mobile sawmills mounted on the back of flatbed trailers. Its proud Army Reserve lumbermen are stationed in Hurley, Wisconsin.[18]

Sfc. Troy D. Morgan is assigned to the 377th Transportation Company at Grafenwöhr, Germany. He holds a bachelor's degree in history and government from Columbia College, Missouri.

NOTES

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3. William M. Venable, *The Second Regiment of United States Volunteer Engineers: A History* (Cincinnati, 1899), pp. 29–31, 39–42.
4. Ibid., pp. 43–44.
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10. Simmons and Davies, *Twentieth Engineers, France*.
11. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1948), p. 1.
12. Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, *The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 142.
13. *800th Engineer Forestry Company: Historical Account of the Activities of the 800th Engineer Forestry Company during World War II, 1942–1945.* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 53–54.
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15. John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea: The United States Army in the Korean Conflict* (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 11–13.
16. Eugene P. Fortson, Jr. "Railroad Bridge Reconstruction in Korea," *The Military Engineer* 46 (1954): 410–13.
17. Robert R. Ploger, *U.S. Army Engineers, 1965–1970* (Washington, D.C., 1974), pp. 44, 68.
18. Interview, author with M Sgt Eric Nasi, Detachment 2, 6015th Garrison Support Unit, Hurley, Wis., 18 Aug 98.

The Chattanooga Campaign and the Art of Military History: A Review Essay

By Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

The battles for Chattanooga, Tennessee, began on the evening of 20 September 1863, when elements of two corps of the Union Army of the Cumberland fell back upon that strategic railway junction in disorganization and defeat. Nestled in a great loop of the Tennessee River and surrounded on all sides by mountains, Chattanooga was a necessary base for future Federal operations against the industrial and communications center of Atlanta, Georgia. It also represented a potential death trap for any army besieged there. The Lincoln administration made every effort to relieve its endangered forces. In *The Shipwreck of Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), Peter Cozzens, the author of previous studies of the battles of Stones River and Chickamauga, examines how the Northern effort, lasting over two months, succeeded and the opposing Confederate attempt, feeble by contrast, failed.[1]

Cozzens is a fine writer. His account is well organized and vividly described. He excels at penned portraits of situations and possesses considerable understanding of the psychological dimension of human relationships. He provides the best available and most detailed account, for example, of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's secret meeting with Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in mid-October 1863. Stanton gave Grant two orders, with the option of choosing one. Both assigned the general to command the new Military Division of the Mississippi. One retained Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland. The other relieved him and elevated Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in his stead. Grant opted for the latter—the choice for which Stanton had devoutly hoped. While Cozzens' analysis of the rationale for Grant's decision is authoritative, Cozzens slights context. He is much less successful in explaining the military actions—or in this case inaction—which justified Rosecrans' relief and the machinations in Chattanooga and Washington that preceded Stanton's visit to Grant.

Cozzens' descriptions of combat actions at the brigade and regimental levels constitute one of the great strengths of his book. His work adopts the "men against fire" approach of André du Picq, Stephen Crane, S. L. A. Marshall, and John Keegan. Cozzens is also very careful to identify exactly where each unit was located and when, very much in the Grand Army of the Republic–United Confederate Veterans–National Park Service tradition of battlefield memorialization. He has mined an impressive amount of material to do so, including published official records, regimental histories, diaries, and soldiers' letters, as well as both the published and unpublished correspondence of the commanders. The result is a brilliant account of a succession of small unit actions.

Cozzens' vivid portrayal of the efforts of the 93d Illinois Infantry at the battle of Tunnel Hill on 25 November 1863 illustrates his technique. The regiment, commanded by Col. Holden Putnam, charged up the incline to reinforce the 27th Pennsylvania Infantry, already heavily engaged. Expecting to find a coherent line, Putnam and his men discovered only knots of disorganized survivors from an earlier attack. The Pennsylvanians were huddled behind whatever cover the ground provided and engaged in a long-range firefight with the Confederate defenders. No sooner had the regiment passed through the Pennsylvanians than it was ambushed by two Arkansas regiments that had hidden in woods in front of the Confederate main line. As the Illinoisans wavered and began to fall back in response to the sudden burst of fire, Putnam, mounted on a large black horse, grabbed the regimental flag and shouted to his men never to forsake the colors. The next instant he was shot dead, and the regiment fell back in some confusion on the Pennsylvanians. The survivors dug in and fought as well as their relative lack of cover and dwindling supply of ammunition allowed. Their ammunition almost exhausted, they were overrun by a massed Confederate bayonet assault late in the afternoon. Only a pitiful remnant of the regiment made it to the safety of the Federal reserve position at the bottom of the hill.

Such a focus on small unit actions provides a clear memorial function. (A painting of Colonel Putnam attempting to rally his regiment graces the dust jacket.) It also makes an important contribution to the emerg-

ing historiography of the evolution of tactics exemplified by the works of John A. English, Paddy Griffith, and Perry Jamieson.[2] Cozzens' weakness in this regard is that, while he can often explain exactly what happened and why, he is not always as clear as to what was intended or what should have been done. He would have to consult standard tactical manuals of the day to understand intent and post–Civil War manuals and texts for the lessons that the survivors drew from the conflict. Nevertheless, Cozzens makes a genuine contribution to understanding the experience of the men who "saw the elephant" in the Civil War. Grasping that reality, and the physical and psychological wounds it inflicted, will make it easier for students of post–Civil War American history to assess fairly the impact of veterans on politics and social policy.

Cozzens' research design and narrative suggest that he views battle as a collection of firefights. Understand each firefight and their interrelation, and you will comprehend the entire engagement. Such an approach is certainly intelligible for anyone influenced by the war in Vietnam or the computer models describing that conflict's ground combat. While this conceptualization has merit, it leaves out some important components—most notably the commander's intent.

Consider Cozzens' discussion of Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's assault on Lookout Mountain on 24 November 1863, the famous "battle above the clouds." Cozzens cursorily reviews Hooker's plans and then reverts to his focus on small units. He follows the deployment of Brig. Gen. John W. Geary's division across Lookout Creek, its advance along the palisade, and its successive attacks on the Confederate brigades of Brig. Gens. Edward C. Walthall, John C. Moore, and Edmund Pettus. In the process Cozzens does some very good work. His account of Lt. Col. Eugene Powell's seizure of the initial bridgehead over the creek is a classic. The author's descriptions of the faintheartedness of General Geary and the drunkenness of one of the Federal brigade commanders, Brig. Gen. Walter Whitaker, raise the question of how many of the tactical inanities of the Civil War—and the appalling casualties that often resulted—were a result of commanders who either lacked the physical courage to face the terrors of the battlefield or resorted to the bottle to pass the test. These are interesting lines for future research. The only difficulty with the account is that Cozzens does not give a clear statement of Hooker's plan: to use Geary's reinforced division to take the Confederates in flank while deploying three other brigades to keep the Southerners' attention focused to their front. It was the ability of the troops to execute this plan, despite some weak intermediate commanders, that achieved the tactical (and ultimately operational-level) victory at Lookout Mountain.

The battles around Chattanooga closely conform to Clausewitz's definition of a campaign as a series of

Renewed Call for Papers: June 2000 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is continuing to solicit papers for the June 2000 biennial Conference of Army Historians. The theme of the conference will be "The Korean War." Papers may address the background, conduct, or impact of the war. The conference organizers are seeking papers relating to all aspects of military operations in Korea, including the impact of military and civilian leaders, the contributions of various branches and organizations in the Army, the roles of other U.S. military services, and the operations of the military forces of other nations. Discussions of the diplomatic and political context of the war are also welcome. A secondary focus of the conference will be the Cold War, and the Center is particularly interested in papers addressing the impact of the Korean War on other facets of the Cold War.

The conference will be held on 6–8 June 2000 at the Sheraton National Hotel in Arlington, Virginia. Prospective participants should send their proposed paper topics either by mail to Dr. William Stivers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058, or by electronic mail to *william.stivers@hqda.army.mil*. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Stivers at (202) 685-2729.

linked engagements. In contrast to the Stones River and Chickamauga campaigns, in each of which one major battle overshadowed all else, the Chattanooga campaign consisted of a number of important actions which varied considerably in size—Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry raid, the landing at Brown's Ferry, the night battle of near Wauhatchie, the capture of Orchard Knob, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's crossing of the Tennessee River, the attack on Lookout Mountain, the fight at Tunnel Hill, the assault on Missionary Ridge, Hooker's crossing of Chickamauga Creek, and Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne's rearguard action at Ringgold Gap. While the Missionary Ridge assault on 25 November 1863 was a large engagement—and one of the most dramatic of the war—it was in a sense superfluous. Hooker's forcing of Chickamauga Creek, often ignored by historians, had already rendered the Confederate position untenable. General Braxton Bragg would have had to withdraw on the evening of 25–26 November simply to protect his rear areas, since his ability to retire across West Chickamauga Creek would soon have been threatened even had the assault on Missionary Ridge never been made.

Cozzens is thus weak at a level of analysis where the nature of the campaign demands that he be strongest—at the operational level of war, to use the modern idiom. Grant in Cozzens' treatment is curiously detached, almost a spectator for much of the campaign rather than the directing brain who shaped the Northern effort. This is not to argue that everything went according to plan, as Bruce Catton once suggested in *Grant Takes Command* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). Over a decade ago James Lee McDonough's book *Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984) exploded Catton's argument that the assault on Missionary Ridge was part of some master plan. Rather, Grant had constructed such a flexible operational plan that he could easily shift the focus of the Union effort from one flank to another or to the center, depending on the circumstances of the moment.

The problem is not that Cozzens ignores the operational level but that it is not the focus of his research and analysis. Cozzens knows what happened on the tactical level, and he can read a map. On this basis he delivers *ex cathedra* judgments about operational decisions. But questions of command and control require research and analysis as careful and and systematic as those of minor tactics. A historian seeking to address command and control in a serious fashion must answer a whole series of related questions. What were the means of control available to a commander at any particular time—field telegraph, wigwag (torch or flag), or mounted courier? To what extent did meteorological conditions permit or inhibit long-range communications? (To his credit Cozzens does describe the effect of weather on operations, although not on communications.) Where did the commander locate his headquarters? How soon did he receive information from the front, and how quickly could he react to it? How did he use his staff to process information, reach decisions, and communicate them to his subordinates? How clear and precise were his orders? (Cozzens does address the content and clarity of Sherman's orders at Tunnel Hill.) To what extent did he use—or bypass—the chain of command and with what consequences? Cozzens answers some of these questions for General Geary, a division commander, at Lookout Mountain, but ignores most of them for General Sherman, an army commander, at Tunnel Hill.

Just a year after the University of Illinois Press published *The Shipwreck of Their Hopes*, St. Martin's Press released *Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863*, by Wiley Sword. Sword's account is much more satisfactory on the operational level than Cozzens' book, although Cozzens is surely correct to blame General Bragg and Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge for the Confederate debacle at Missionary Ridge rather than Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee as Sword does. Sword provides some discussion of the practical issues of command and control but gives no systematic analysis.

Readers with neither the time nor the inclination to read more than one book on the Chattanooga campaign will probably do best to stick with McDonough's *Chattanooga*. Although his volume was the first book-length treatment of the campaign and remains the shortest, it addressed most of the major issues. McDonough pitched his analysis at a higher level than either Cozzens or Sword and confronted what might be called the grand strategic issue posed by the campaign—how did it contribute to the eventual outcome of the war? McDonough argued that by late 1863 an outright military victory was beyond the capacity of

the Confederacy. The possibility of foreign intervention had also evaporated. The one hope remaining for the South was to prolong the conflict until war weariness led the North to seek a negotiated settlement. A Confederate victory at Chattanooga would have required Federal forces in the West to start their 1864 campaign one hundred miles farther north than they eventually did, leaving Atlanta a distant rather than an immediate objective. This analysis is very satisfying—which perhaps explains why neither Cozzens nor Sword even addresses the issue. Furthermore, Cozzens' emphasis on the tactical battle makes for a confusing introduction to the campaign for first-time readers. While Sword's concentration on the operational level alleviates this particular problem, his discussion of the strategic background is disjointed. Thus, readers who want an in-depth understanding of the campaign need to read all three volumes.

Those who want only a brief overview can now also obtain that from the fine recent study by Steven E. Woodworth, *Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). Woodworth's subtitle is somewhat misleading as *Six Armies* encompasses the Tullahoma campaign as well as the two it advertises. Only 217 pages long, Woodworth's book devotes some 89 pages to the Chattanooga campaign alone. A distinguished student of Confederate military history, Woodworth writes clearly and directly.[3] He displays a good grasp of both the operational issues and the logistical factors that shaped the commanders' major decisions. In particular, he provides the best available analysis and defense of the decisions made by General Bragg at the operational level during the campaign. Woodworth effectively synthesizes the existing literature, drawing not only on the volumes already mentioned in this essay but also on Roger Pickenpaugh's excellent *Rescue by Rail: Troop Transfer and the Civil War in the West, 1863* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), which he consulted in manuscript. But most important, Woodworth can express his impressions in memorable style. Having Nathan Bedford Forrest in an army, he observes, "was something like operating in concert with a band of formidable but unpredictable barbarian allies" (p. 29). The weaknesses of Woodworth's book are the weaknesses of the literature—the early portions of the Knoxville campaign and mounted operations generally—as well as the brevity of his account.

Indeed, given the complexity of the Chattanooga campaign, even Cozzens and Sword face the problem that a sustained analysis of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as well as the political background would require a book more than twice as long as either author has produced. This may explain why there is remarkably little overlap between their two books, which cover the same campaign. Thus, for example, Cozzens gives a far more detailed version of the Federal preparations to seize a bridgehead at Brown's Ferry, while Sword is much more informative on Sherman's crossing of the Tennessee. McDonough and Woodworth provide intelligent introductions to the campaign, but for an in-depth understanding readers will have to turn to both Cozzens and Sword.

A single-volume definitive history of the Chattanooga campaign cannot, however, simply be either Cozzens or Sword writ longer. Such a study will need to be based on a whole series of specialized articles and monographs on particular aspects of the campaign. Their volumes suggest these topics, even as they cannot provide wholly satisfactory treatments of them. More study is needed on cavalry operations; command and control; staff organization, procedures, and operations; communications; intelligence collection and analysis; engineer operations (topographic, construction, and combat); logistics; and the complementary campaign in East Tennessee, with particular reference to how political developments may or may not have affected operations in that theater. For a model of how to analyze the interplay of political considerations and military operations, the prospective author of the definitive study need go no further than *Mountains Touched with Fire*. One of Sword's major contributions is to demonstrate the effect of the Ohio elections on the timing of Rosecrans' relief. Lincoln waited until the soldier vote was safely in from the Army of the Cumberland before he allowed Secretary Stanton to proceed west to his fateful meeting with General Grant.

Several of the subjects outlined above are closely interrelated and can resolve themselves into a series of detailed questions. Take cavalry operations, for example. Neither McDonough, Cozzens, nor Sword gives a satisfactory account of mounted operations in

the campaign. Yet they were crucial in determining when the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland would practically starve in Chattanooga, as they did after Wheeler's raid, and when they would not, as after the Federal riposte led by Brig. Gen. George Crook and others. The absence of cavalry around Chattanooga proper deprived the Union Army of the capabilities that branch traditionally provided—screening infantry advances, protecting flanks, executing close and distant reconnaissance, and engaging in pursuit missions. It is difficult to see how Col. John Bratton could have surprised Geary's division at Wauhatchie if cavalry had accompanied Hooker's relief column from Bridgeport, Alabama. Similarly, Sherman's advance toward Tunnel Hill on 24 November would have been aided immeasurably by the presence of cavalry to screen his flanks and front. Mounted patrols could have reconnoitered the Confederate position. In these circumstances, Sherman would have been less likely to be confused about his objective.

The traditional explanation is that the level of supply in Chattanooga precluded the use of cavalry. However, its absence might also have reflected Grant and Sherman's lack of familiarity with the capabilities of the mounted arm. To sustain or refute either explanation will require knowledge of both the commanders' perceptions of the logistical situation and the hard truth of that situation. What, for example, was the hauling capacity of the standard Army supply wagon? How much transport could Grant accumulate along the line of communications of the Army of the Cumberland? How many wagonloads could the Bridgeport–Brown's Ferry route sustain? How depleted were the depots in Chattanooga by the time Hooker reestablished the Bridgeport line of communications? What were the normal daily supply requirements of the troops and animals in and around Chattanooga? How much of the troops' supply was normally provided by local purchase? Given the debilitated state of the garrison, what additional nutriments and how much time were required to restore men and animals to a level of health sufficient for sustained exertion? How much additional supply, particularly forage, would a mounted regiment, brigade, or division have consumed?

The types of materials that will provide answers to these and related questions include Army quartermaster and commissary manuals, as well as the latest research on the medical issues involved. The answers themselves will not necessarily be precise, but they should at least provide a standard by which to evaluate the logistical constraints on the armies' operational decisions. Donald Engels' minor masterpiece, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), might serve as a guide for anyone interested in pursuing this line of analysis.

These kinds of detailed questions about one aspect of logistical operations naturally lead to a broader consideration of the organization, procedures, and operation of the Federal and Confederate supply services. How were the armies' logistical operations administered at the level of the geographic department or division? To what extent were the bureaus autonomous, or to what extent were they guided by the commanders' intent? Did commissary and quartermaster officers even have accurate information about the supplies they had available—either in transit or in depot? Sword is at pains to detail how remarkably slow Rosecrans was in responding to the supply crisis in Chattanooga. Did this reflect Rosecrans' post-Chickamauga stupor or a deeper and more systemic problem in logistical administration? How pervasive was corruption? Cozzens is particularly instructive about lower-level corruption within Chattanooga. Did some supply officers get a head start on Gilded Age fortunes during the campaign? What was the impact of corruption on supply operations?

Until such work is completed and synthesized, McDonough, Cozzens, and Sword will remain indispensable for understanding the Chattanooga campaign in detail. Woodworth's book may endure even longer as a brief introduction to those operations. *The Shipwreck of Their Hopes* is the concluding volume of Cozzens' trilogy on the Army of the Cumberland. At the time of its publication, I was concerned that the volume might also mark the end of the author's work as a historian. It is, after all, an avocation for this Foreign Service officer. Cozzens, however, has continued to write about the Civil War. In 1997 the University of North Carolina Press published another fine Cozzens study, *The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth*. In 1998 the same press issued *The Military Memoirs of General John Pope*, edited by Cozzens and Robert I. Girardi. The high

quality of these studies is not surprising, for Cozzens' *Shipwreck* is one of the finest examples of the application of the "new military history" to the battlefield. It deserves the attention not only of students of the American Civil War but of all those interested in the evolution of warfare.

Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., is a historian in the Center's Histories Branch. The Center plans to publish his book, tentatively titled Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II, *in 2000.*

NOTES

1. This paper substantially expands ideas first developed in my review of *The Shipwreck of Their Hopes* that appeared in the *Illinois Historical Journal* 88 (Winter 1995): 294–95. I thank the editor of that journal for permission to revise and extend my remarks in this forum. Cozzens' earlier works were *No Better Place To Die: The Battle of Stones River* (Urbana, Ill., 1990) and *This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga* (Urbana, Ill., 1992).

2. John A. English, *A Perspective on Infantry* (New York, 1981); Paddy Griffith, *Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future* (1981, reprint ed., Novato, Calif., 1990), and *Battle Tactics of the Civil War* (New Haven, Conn., 1987); Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, *Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage* (University, Ala., 1982); Perry D. Jamieson, *Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865–1899* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1994).

3. For other examples of his work, see Steven E. Woodworth, *Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Campaign Command in the West*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kans., 1990), and *Davis and Lee at War*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kans., 1995).

Upcoming Military History Conferences

The Society of Military History will hold its annual conference at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, on 28–30 April 2000. The themes of the conference will be "Korea 1950 and 400 Years of Limited War." Further information about the conference is available from Professor Gordon Rudd, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Quantico, Virginia 22134–5068.

The Council on America's Military Past will hold its 34th annual military history conference at the Radisson Hotel in Burlington, Vermont, on 10–14 May 2000. The conference will devote particular attention to military activities around Lake Champlain, North American wars from the French and Indian War to the War of 1812, the Civil War, and Canadian military history. Further information may be obtained from the council by writing to P.O. Box 1151, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211–1151, or by phoning (703) 912-6124.

Siena College will hold a multidisciplinary 60th anniversary conference on World War II at its Loudonville, New York, campus on 1–2 June 2000. The conference will focus on worldwide political, military, diplomatic, cultural, and artistic developments in the year 1940. Further information may be obtained by writing to Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, New York 12211–1462; by calling 518-783-2512; or by sending an electronic mail inquiry to *legendziewic@siena.edu.*

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will hold its biennial Conference of Army Historians on 6–8 June 2000 at the Sheraton National Hotel in Arlington, Virginia. The theme of the conference will be the Korean War and its impact. Further information may be obtained by contacting William Stivers by phone at (202) 685-2729 or by electronic mail at *william.stivers@hqda.army.mil.*

Book Review
by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne

Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812
by C. Edward Skeen
University Press of Kentucky, 1999, 240 pp., $27.50

After years of being ignored, the War of 1812 has become the focus of increasing scholarly interest. In the past decade several new general histories of high quality have appeared, as have numerous battle studies and biographies of participants.[1] C. Edward Skeen, a professor of history at the University of Memphis and biographer of Secretary of War John Armstrong, has now written a study providing an overview of the role militia played in the war.

Skeen states that his objective is to describe the national government's use of the militia as a major source of manpower and to evaluate the militia's effectiveness. He also sets out to examine the operational role of the militia in federal service and to explain its lack of success while in state and local service. Skeen quickly makes it very clear that in his view the militia was consistently ineffective because of deficient state and federal support and poor organization. He further argues that the pressures created by a succession of wartime disasters led the states to create constitutionally questionable semipermanent forces.

A large part of Skeen's research involved a meticulous perusal of the state and federal laws establishing the militia system in the early republic. Skeen minutely describes the shifting congressional efforts to propose and, on occasion, pass laws intended to correct acknowledged deficiencies in the system. His focus on the laws sometimes obscures the realities of militia activity. Although in his introduction he defines the militia as being composed of both drafted and volunteer elements, he rarely differentiates between the two, implying a universal ineptitude that was not always the case.

The first part of the book considers the policies and procedures adopted at the state and federal levels to raise a militia force and the various legal problems that ensued. Skeen describes the different approaches used in each state to enforce militia laws, as well as the states' responses to practical problems in leadership and logistics. He also discusses the ill-defined relationship between state and federal authorities over issues of supply, organization, and financing.

Skeen next provides an operational summary, organized by geographic region, of the events in the war in which militia participated, and he then analyzes these developments. Skeen argues that the American campaigns in the Old Northwest were successful, despite considerable confusion and manpower turbulence, due only to the availability of large numbers of enthusiastic militiamen. In describing operations along the Niagara and St. Lawrence Rivers, Skeen gives the impression that once again the militia was paramount. Except for the earliest engagements there, however, the Regular Army actually played the major role on these fronts, demonstrating initial incompetence before gradually improving. Although he does not draw this conclusion directly, Skeen's evidence indicates that the root of the problems in New York and New England were political and organizational.

Skeen focuses his discussion of operations in the Chesapeake region on the disasters of Havre de Grace and Bladensburg-Washington. In describing the militia's unsuccessful attempts to fend off British raids in the Chesapeake, Skeen does not point out that the failures were often the result of political decisions relating to force structure rather than anything intrinsically wrong with militia. For example, despite Virginia militia officers' pleas for cavalry to enable quick movement to crisis points, the state legislature continued to authorize only the slower-moving and cheaper infantry. Curiously, Skeen barely mentions the unequivocal militia successes at Craney Island, Virginia, in June 1813 and Baltimore, Maryland, in September 1814. His overview of the war in the South documents the same types of political and funding problems the militia encountered elsewhere and concludes with a positive description of its performance in the New Orleans campaign.

Skeen concludes his book with an overview of postwar legislative changes that increased the nation's reliance on regulars in peacetime and volunteers in

war. He views the resurgence of militia forces in the labor crises of the 1870s as leading to the creation of the National Guard but does not take note of an earlier surge in the volunteer militia in the slave crises of 1831 and 1859.

Skeen's review of the legislation and his spotlight on the militia of the War of 1812 have provided a useful service. His operational discussions are occasionally misleading, however. For example, the death of Sir Peter Parker at Caulk's Field, Maryland, which Skeen does not name, (pp. 137–38) occurred during a successful militia defense against a British diversion conducted in support of the Patuxent-Washington operations, not as a preliminary to the Baltimore attack. Militia played a relatively minor role at the siege of Fort Erie, Ontario, in August–September 1814 (pp. 122–23), which would be hard to conclude from the text. The action Skeen describes there, led by Joseph Willcocks, involved Regulars from the 21st Infantry, New York militiamen, and the remnants of Willcocks's unit known as the Canadian Volunteers. The latter was comprised of men from Upper Canada, not American militiamen.

Strong leadership was one of the constants that appear repeatedly in Skeen's descriptions of American militia success. Robert Taylor at Craney Island, William H. Harrison at the Thames, Samuel Smith at Baltimore, and Andrew Jackson at New Orleans all triumphed with forces that were mostly militia. This would suggest that the reason for militia failures might be more complex than Skeen implies. Leadership obviously was a factor. Hints at the reasons for militia unit quality or its absence often may be found in county and local histories that Skeen did not consult.

Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 provides a good overview of militia law and the state-federal politics related to it, and it raises some worthy questions for further study. It does not give a completely clear picture of the militia organizations in various states, nor does it deal with the alleged impropriety of the growth of "state armies" warned about in the introduction. Skeen is right in saying much work is necessary on the militia era. I suggest that the groundwork for such research was well laid out in the 1955 study of U.S. Army mobilization authored by Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry.[2]

NOTES

1. Noteworthy are Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana, Ill., 1989), and John R. Elting, *Amateurs, To Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991).
2. Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1st Lt. Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20–212 (Washington, 1955).

Dr. Joseph W. A. Whitehorne is a professor of history at Lord Fairfax Community College in Middletown, Virginia. He is the author of While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie, 1814 *(Baltimore, 1992) and* The Battle for Baltimore, 1814 *(Baltimore, 1997) and co-author of* Death at Snake Hill: Secrets from a War of 1812 Cemetery *(Toronto, 1993).*

Book Review
by Thomas Goss

Civil War Generals in Defeat
edited by Steven E. Woodworth
University of Kansas Press, 1999, 240 pp., $29.95

"The test of merit in my profession with the people is success," wrote Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, accurately judging the standard on which contemporary critics and many historians would judge his generalship. This quotation and an examination of its significance begin Steven E. Woodworth's introduction to a series of seven essays in *Civil War Generals in Defeat*. As the editor and director of this study, Woodworth seeks to examine why some of the most capable antebellum officers proved to be failures under the test of war. The result is a very interesting and provocative, if somewhat disjointed, analysis of famous men deemed by generations of Civil War historians as "losers."

The historians who provide the various essays take on this reductionist view by going beyond assertions of incompetence to seek other causal factors behind the defeats these men suffered. Woodworth observes that the essays' authors "do not always agree on the rights and wrongs of any given general's case, but they do agree that something is to be learned by taking a

closer look at the cases of generals who at least seemed meritorious yet nevertheless failed." (p. 4) The authors search for deeper explanations as they attempt to ascertain why competent commanders such as A. S. Johnston, George McClellan, Robert E. Lee, and others usually considered professionally competent antebellum officers failed during some of the most famous campaigns of the Civil War.

Woodworth himself starts this exploration of unsuccessful generalship with Albert Sidney Johnston and his failure to hold the Confederate line in Tennessee in early 1862. In an essay entitled "When Merit Was Not Enough," he sets the tone for the book by examining how Johnston lost the defensive campaign that opened the Confederacy to invasion in the West. At the start of the war, Johnston was described as a "soldier's soldier" and ranked with Robert E. Lee and Henry W. Halleck as the most promising officers in their respective armies. Yet Johnston failed the test of generalship in two short months as his army was defeated repeatedly in battle, being driven in the process from Kentucky and much of Tennessee.

Woodworth illuminates the various factors that combined to frustrate Johnston at Shiloh, where his victory on the first day of the battle turned into a defeat on the second. Johnston's conduct of this campaign convinced Woodworth that the Confederate commander was a capable and resolute officer but one who failed in the end because he did not learn the lessons the Civil War was teaching as rapidly as did his opponents. Johnston was also let down by his subordinates, especially P. G. T. Beauregard. Moreover, he was unlucky to command during an early period of amateurism while facing a resolute opponent in Ulysses S. Grant. Given time, Johnston might have developed into a successful general; but unlike Robert E. Lee or Grant, Johnston's first major test as a commander was his last, as he died leading his forces' attack on Pittsburg Landing on 6 April 1862.

Alan Downs next renders a verdict on Joseph E. Johnston's campaign in Virginia that ended with his wounding at Fair Oaks at the end of May 1862. Turning to the Union high command, Ethan Rafuse's appropriately titled essay, "Fighting for Defeat?" analyzes George B. McClellan's Peninsula campaign. Stephen Engle then assesses Don Carlos Buell's campaign for Chattanooga and the story of this much-pilloried Union general. Taking on another disparaged Union commander, Stephen Sears defends Joseph Hooker's conduct of the Chancellorsville campaign in an essay that presents some of the conclusions from his latest book, *Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac* (Boston, 1999). Following this theme, Michael Ballard looks at John C. Pemberton's defense of Vicksburg and what led this general to be assigned such a vital mission, for which he apparently was ill prepared.

The last essay on Gettysburg may well provide the book's most intriguing insights. Brooks Simpson here looks at the successes and failures of the best-known command relationships at the most studied battle of this most studied war in American history. Simpson examines how and why the combination of Lee, Longstreet, Stuart, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, arguably one of the best teams of commanders assembled during the war, managed not to achieve the success to which they were individually accustomed. This study of Gettysburg reveals how the outcome of a battle need not bear a direct correlation to the comparative skill and talent of the commanders. However, Simpson's article also demonstrates the inherent limitations of essay collections such as this, as he must address a single historical event, leaving him little room for an in-depth analysis of such a fascinating and complex issue.

The strength of Woodworth's book is the pure enjoyment of hearing from such an eminent group of historians on the topic of Civil War commanders and savoring their fresh approach to many of these famous historical figures. By examining famous Civil War generals who have borne the stigma of failure, the seven case studies reveal a myriad of reasons for these commanders' collective lack of success—the failure of key subordinates, a want of resources, an inability to adapt to a changing situation, a critical error of judgment, inherent flaws of character, or even simply an exceptionally good performance by their opponents. A willingness to explore this last reason for military defeat—the challenge of a more talented enemy commander—reveals how these essays can illuminate the danger of stereotyping defeated commanders as incompetent "losers."

The two main weaknesses of this volume reflect the twin dangers of edited collections. The first challenge for the reader is the absence of a clear analytical framework to tie the essays together. While

maintaining a central theme, each author appears to use a different definition of generalship and to examine disparate factors while seeking to explain failure. While this highlights the complexity of the issue, it does not assist the reader in drawing comparative conclusions from the diverse essays. The second challenge requires the reader to understand these campaigns before starting this book, as each essay is too brief to give much background information and must stress analysis over narrative. This may make the book more interesting for those already familiar with the events of the war but less rewarding for any reader lacking basic knowledge of the military struggle.

Among those interested in Civil War command in particular or military leadership in general, however, the talent and skillful prose of the authors assembled by Woodworth ensures that *Civil War Generals in Defeat* will deservedly attract a considerable audience and inspire much needed debate.

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Book Review
by Stanley L. Falk

Surviving Bataan and Beyond: Colonel Irvin Alexander's Odyssey as a Japanese Prisoner of War
edited by Dominic J. Caraccilo
Stackpole Books, 1999, 340 pp., $24.95

We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese
by Elizabeth M. Norman
Random House, 1999, 327 pp., $26.95

In Enemy Hands: Personal Accounts of Those Taken Prisoner in World War II
by Claire Swedberg
Stackpole Books, 1998, 284 pp., $24.95

At a time when the American public has come to expect military victory without casualties or other human costs, three new books remind us of the toll that men and women of our armed forces have paid in the past, when the public readily accepted and indeed expected willing exposure to risk and unquestioning sacrifice by those in uniform. These books describe the tragic fate of World War II prisoners of war in grim and painful dimensions that contrast sharply with our recent bloodless experience in Kosovo. Two of these volumes concern the shocking ordeal of Americans captured in the Philippines; the third offers a variety of harsh episodes in both Europe and the Pacific.

Surviving Bataan and Beyond is the memoir of a veteran Regular Army officer, edited and annotated two generations later by another career officer currently on active duty. Then Lt. Col. Irvin Alexander (USMA, 1919) was an infantry officer detailed to the Quartermaster Corps and assigned to duty in the Philippines on the eve of World War II. The Japanese assault on the islands found him at Fort Stotsenburg, near Clark Field in central Luzon, where he earned a Silver Star for his courageous actions under heavy aerial attack and in further risking his life to handle an unexploded bomb.

After participating in the difficult withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula, Alexander asked to return to the infantry and was assigned as senior adviser to a Filipino infantry regiment. When a company commander was badly wounded trying to repel a Japanese landing force, Alexander took over his unit. Despite heavy enemy fire, he steadied his men and led them into the Japanese position, suffering severe wounds to his hand and chest and finally collapsing from shock and fatigue. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and after sixteen days in the hospital (during which the enemy landing force was eliminated) returned to duty with the Filipino regiment. Like all others on Bataan during its three-month siege, Alexander suffered the debilitating effects of drastically reduced rations and other supply shortages. On 10 April 1942, a day after the American surrender, he became a prisoner of the Japanese.

Colonel Alexander's POW experience was much like those of thousands of other Americans who suffered the cruelties and barbarities of Japanese captivity. A victim of the infamous Death March from Bataan, he underwent starvation, disease, and

continued harsh mistreatment and brutality during his three and one-half years as a prisoner. When he was shipped to Japan in late 1944, two of the three unmarked prison ships on which he sailed were destroyed by American air and submarine attacks. He survived to finish the war in a POW camp in Korea, sick, starving, emaciated, and little more than half his prewar weight. After a family reunion and six months in an Army hospital, Alexander returned to active duty. Three years later, however, a serious automobile accident hospitalized him for well over two more years and finally led to his retirement.

It was during this long hospital stay that Colonel Alexander put together the memoir reproduced in this book. Evidently based on several reports he wrote immediately after the war, on his own notes and letters, and on a remarkable memory, the memoir has been used in preparing a number of histories—Louis Morton's official volume, *The Fall of the Philippines*; my own *Bataan: The March of Death*; and John Whitman's *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*—but has never before been published in its own right. In preparing Alexander's account for publication, Maj. Dominic J. Caraccilo has remedied this oversight and made a welcome contribution to our knowledge of the Pacific war.

Surviving Bataan and Beyond is a frank, perceptive, and unemotional account of events frequently described but often misunderstood or sensationalized. The editor's detailed annotations and other additions, constituting roughly a third of the book, render it far more comprehensive and meaningful, especially for readers unfamiliar with the events described. Unfortunately, however, both Major Caraccilo and the editors at Stackpole are guilty of an annoying number of small, careless errors. These include many incorrect dates, a few misdesignated units or misidentified individuals, some unfortunate misunderstandings of situations or events, a number of misnumbered footnotes, and an almost completely unreliable index. The maps, most of which appear to be copied from *The Fall of the Philippines*, also contain mistakes not in the originals. And finally, Caraccilo is unaware that the Center for [*sic*] Military History is not located at Carlisle Barracks. While these errors are minor, they detract from what is otherwise a useful, informative, and very readable work.

We Band of Angels is an entirely different and probably more important book, describing the difficult role and experience of American nurses who served on Bataan and Corregidor and in subsequent captivity. While not entirely "untold"—memoirs and briefer accounts have offered previous testimony—it is probably the most thorough and knowledgeable version to date. The author, who holds a Ph.D. in nursing, is director of New York University's doctoral program in that field. A specialist in nursing history and author of a previous study on military nurses in Vietnam, she brings to the present work a knowledgeable and sympathetic understanding of her subject.

The ninety-nine Army and Navy nurses trapped in the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II had what Professor Norman calls "a collective sense of mission" (p. xiv), a dedication to preserving life under the most difficult of circumstances, and a remarkable blend of courage and physical endurance. These qualities enabled them to face and overcome the shortages of food and medicine on Bataan, the exposure to Japanese bombs and shells, the draining fatigue of constant service to the sick and wounded, and the uncertain fear of what surrender to the Japanese might bring. For the "angels" of Bataan, the sudden rush of war and the heavy demands of military medicine came in rude contrast to their previous duties in the orderly environment of hospitals at home or the lazy tropical atmosphere of peacetime duty in the Philippines. Now forced to work under the most trying conditions, they not only maintained their own steady calm efficiency and devotion to duty, but they also served as definite morale boosters for the men trying to defend that beleaguered peninsula.

When the end came, first on Bataan and a month later on Corregidor, about three-quarters of the women—the others had managed to escape with air or sea blockade-runners—fell into Japanese hands. Unlike five Navy nurses seized earlier on Guam, the "angels" were not freed in the exchange of diplomats and other civilians that took place that summer. And unlike Colonel Alexander, they were not thrown into a prisoner of war camp and subjected to the cruelty and brutality that was the lot of the men captured in the Philippines. They were instead held with other Westerners in a civilian internment camp in Manila. Here too, however, they suffered from disease, a near-starvation diet, exhaustion, inadequate medical care, and an oppressive confinement that left them as sick

at heart as they were in body. Although most were somehow able to recover after their liberation and go on with their lives, sometimes quite successfully, others could not. For them, the sacrifice they made did not end with the war's conclusion.

Dr. Norman has drawn her well-told story of the angels largely from personal interviews, correspondence, memoirs, and some contemporary documents. Her material is well organized, highly readable, and, aside from a few errors, quite credible. She does not tell us much about the personnel policy, organization, or administration of the Army Nurse Corps in the Philippines or about military operations in general. And the many Filipina nurses who also served are mentioned only in passing. But her narrative is a warm, low-keyed, and otherwise comprehensive account of a band of heroic women whose sacrifices and accomplishments have too often gone unnoticed.

The final volume considered here, *In Enemy Hands,* is an interesting but inferior work. It consists of separate accounts of the varied World War II experiences of five individuals held against their will—with no connection between them nor any particular explanation of why these five were chosen. The subjects are an American enlisted man taken prisoner on Bataan, a British civilian interned in Shanghai, another U.S. soldier captured during the Battle of the Bulge, a youthful German held by the Americans, and a young East German woman jailed by the occupying Soviets two years after the war. Only the last two personal histories appear to have any significant material not covered in previous publications.

The five stories are narrated by Claire Swedberg, a journalist and author of an earlier book about American paratrooper prisoners of the Germans. They are based essentially on her interviews with her subjects from which she "tried . . . to tell the story as they did, maintaining not only the veracity but [also] the point of view" of each individual. (p. xi) Unfortunately, the "veracity" of these accounts is open to serious question. Not only do they contain doubtful statements and obvious errors of fact, but they also include precise details far beyond the scope of normal memory, including lengthy conversations that could only have been imagined or created out of whole cloth. The best that can be said about this book is that it offers a readable verisimilitude to actual events but is otherwise unreliable.

Dr. Stanley L. Falk was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force and deputy chief historian for Southeast Asia at the Center of Military History. He is the author of Bataan: The March of Death *(New York, 1962) and other books and essays on World War II in the Pacific.*

Book Review
By Susan M. Puska

Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944–47
by Carolle J. Carter
The University Press of Kentucky, 1997, 278 pp., $37.95

Landing on the makeshift runway, the plane thumped to an abrupt halt at an unmarked grave. The impact dislodged the propeller into a slicing spin that barely missed the pilot, Capt. Jack E. Champion, who had bent forward in the cockpit to turn off the engines. Such was the inauspicious beginning on 22 July 1944 of the mission of the Yenan Observer Group at the Chinese Communists' headquarters. Commonly known as the "Dixie Mission," the American joint military operation remained deep within Chinese Communist territory at Yenan in northwest China until early 1947. It provided valuable information to the theater on weather conditions and on the Chinese Communist and Japanese military forces. Notable among its various missions was the observer group's close cooperation with the Chinese Communists to rescue downed pilots and crews within both Japanese-occupied and Communist-controlled areas.

In *Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944–47,* Carolle Carter presents the first comprehensive history of the Dixie Mission from inception to aftermath. Her work significantly enhances the understanding of this controversial mission during the critical period between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War. Prior to the publication of *Mission to Yenan,* retired Col. David G. Barrett's monograph *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944* (Berkeley, Calif., 1970) had stood alone as a focused study of the operation during its first year, when Barrett had served as its initial commanding officer.

To bring this story of the Yenan Observer Group to life, Ms. Carter relied on extensive personal interviews of all the Dixie commanders—seven in less than three years. She also interviewed many other key military and civilian personnel directly involved in the mission, enjoyed access to personal papers and photographs, and conducted research at the National Archives.

The book discusses the most important historical events in which the Yenan Observer Group played a role. Foremost among these were the failed efforts of the presidential emissaries—Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, whom President Roosevelt appointed U.S. ambassador to China in early 1945, and General George C. Marshall—to negotiate a reconciliation between the American-backed Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Hurley's bitterness toward the Yenan Observer Group would be especially damaging. When Hurley abruptly resigned his position on 26 November 1945, he launched a vicious political campaign that helped shape the perception that Dixie personnel either had been duped by the Communists or were disloyal Americans.

Twenty-five years later, Colonel Barrett still carried the deep wounds of an anti-Communist backlash against the Dixie Mission. He observed in 1970, "It is with some trepidation that I write about China at all, since that country has become such a controversial topic . . . that few can think, talk, or write about it objectively. . . . All I can do is ask . . . readers . . . to try to believe me when I say I have never had but one loyalty, the United States of America." (*Dixie Mission, 1944*, pp. 11–12)

Beyond her examination of the Cold War climate that tarnished American perceptions of the mission's accomplishments, Carter has uncovered a wealth of information on its multifaceted operations. Within these details are many lessons from the Dixie Mission that remain relevant today to the U.S. military's relations with the Chinese People's Liberation Army—the successor of the Eighth Route Army in Yenan—under the overarching policy of constructive engagement. Among the Dixie Mission's problems were difficulty in maintaining cohesive effort, problems with communication, and internal rivalries and competition, particularly in intelligence work.

The Dixie Mission was actually a loose collection of military assets under the direct control of various parent organizations, among them the military services, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Air Ground Aid Service, a recovery group. Rather than forming a cohesive joint operation, each element remained more accountable to its separate headquarters than to the Dixie commander. This lack of unity within the organization played into the hands of the Chinese, who tended to identify and use those who appeared to best support their own interests.

Communist leaders, such as Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, perceived that some Americans were friendly toward the Communists and, consequently, could be used in their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. Chiang, for his part, cultivated his own loyal American supporters, some of whom worked against the Dixie Mission.

Influenced by the growing anti-Communist domestic environment, American national security objectives remained inflexibly tied to a corrupt Nationalist regime as it moved ever closer to an irretrievable death spiral. In this atmosphere, the reports of the Dixie Mission, which raised the possibility of a Communist victory, were often ignored, dismissed, or—worst of all—viewed as support for the Communists.

Despite the congressionally mandated "jointness" of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, problems of parochialism, interservice and interagency rivalries, and insufficient coordination and control continue to undermine the United States' international military relations today. Since the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. relations with China have remained highly politicized by a fractured consensus. Military relations with the Chinese Communists are almost as precarious today as they were for the Dixie Mission at the end of World War II.

The Dixie Mission demonstrated that in the delicate balance between civil and military relations in the United States, perceptions are often more important than realities. When the public, as represented by Congress, concludes that military leaders lack considered judgment, particularly in their dealings with a potentially hostile power, this damages trust and confidence and may overshadow the military's positive accomplishments. As the ultimate guarantor of national security, the military component of power, consequently, should be used judiciously even in peacetime engagement.

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Book Review
by Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

Beyond the Beachhead
The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy
by Joseph Balkoski
Second edition, with a foreword by Stephen E. Ambrose
Stackpole Books, 1999, 304 pp., paper, $14.95

The Battle of Gettysburg is considered by many to have been the decisive battle of the American Civil War. Shortly after the battle was fought, participants recognized it as particularly significant, and over the years Gettysburg has assumed a special aura and has come to symbolize the entire Civil War. In a similar manner, D-Day (6 June 1944), and especially the assault landings at OMAHA Beach, have come to represent America's singularly outstanding achievements in the worldwide conflagration of World War II, as well as to symbolize the selfless sacrifices of an entire generation.

Elements of two U.S. Army infantry divisions, the 1st and the 29th, conducted the D-Day assault landings at OMAHA Beach, considered the most heavily defended of all the Normandy beaches. The 1st Infantry Division (the "Big Red One") was the oldest and one of the most experienced combined arms organizations in the U.S. Army, a veteran of combat in North Africa in 1942 and Sicily in 1943. The 29th Infantry Division (the "Blue and Gray" Division), on the other hand, when mobilized in February 1941 consisted of National Guardsmen from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. *Beyond the Beachhead* chronicles in exceptional detail the World War II history of the 29th Infantry Division from its mobilization at Fort George G. Meade through unit training, deployment to the British Isles, preparation for and the actual cataclysmic assault landings at OMAHA Beach, and the capture of the Normandy town of St. Lo (18 July 1944).

Author and historian Joseph Balkoski considers his book, *Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy*, "a compilation of a thousand stories, pieced together like a jigsaw puzzle into a larger whole." (p. xii) The pieces of this puzzle are contemporary (World War II) letters, newspapers, and unit war diaries, coupled with later interviews, reminiscences, and correspondence. Many of these puzzle pieces had associated faces, notably that of Lt. Col. John P. Cooper, Jr., who commanded the division's 110th Field Artillery Battalion from 1942 to 1945 and whose anecdotes appear throughout the study. A number of other officers are frequently quoted, with noncommissioned officers also providing firsthand information. There are, however, an unnecessarily (and annoyingly) large number of quotations attributed to anonymous "29ers."

Chapter 5, "Men and Guns," for example, is particularly interesting. It compares the force structure, manning, individual and crew-served weapons, communications and other equipment, and tactics at all echelons of the 29th Infantry Division with those of the German 352d Division, which defended against the Americans at OMAHA Beach. The chapter contains a number of disconcerting inaccuracies, however, one of the foremost being the author's notion that rifle squads frequently operated independently and when necessary called directly upon other rifle squads for assistance (pp. 88, 105).

The subsequent chapters on "D-Day" and "The Beachhead" are vividly written and mesmerizing, lucidly detailing the thoughts, fears, trials, and tribulations of some of the soldiers who assaulted OMAHA Beach. The book's final three chapters chronicle the division's demanding and frequently chaotic operations beyond the beachhead, culminating in the capture of St. Lo.

Balkoski continually emphasizes the distinct character of the 29th Infantry Division as a National Guard unit, whose officers had noteworthy philosophical differences with Regular Army officers, especially West Point graduates. By mid-1944, however, it is doubtful how many of the division's

soldiers had been prewar guardsmen. Indeed, the author states that as early as April 1941, only two months after mobilization, "newcomers, in fact, usually outnumbered the old hands in each outfit. In the 175th Infantry, which had an authorized strength of about 3,500 men, 2,000 of the troops were draftees." (p. 20) It is therefore debatable how distinct the division's National Guard character remained by D-Day.

While the reminiscences and anecdotes of division combat veterans woven into the text could be considered a strength of the book, they may actually be more of a weakness in terms of historical veracity, since forty- or fifty-year-old recollections may be selective and untrustworthy, the victims of embellishment, wishful thinking, or just a bad memory. The book has no endnotes, providing instead only a short paragraph that relates in general terms the sources used in each chapter, and quotations are not directly referenced. More than three dozen photographs ably illustrate the text. The thirty maps in this book are generally satisfactory, although they do not include conventional military symbols. An interesting ten-page appendix, "US and German Tables of Organization and Equipment, June 1944," is included. For this second edition of the book the author does not seem to have updated his research and included information from studies that appeared since the book was first published in 1989.

Soldiers of the 29th Infantry Division stared death in the face in the swirling surf and murderous maelstrom of Omaha Beach on D-Day. The division then remained in combat for 242 days and sustained 28,776 casualties—a rate of 204 percent. Balkoski's *Beyond the Beachhead* is an interesting and fitting memorial to the unmitigated gallantry and selfless sacrifices of those "Blue and Gray" Division soldiers and other equally valiant American troops who helped ensure ultimate victory in World War II.

Lt. Col. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, served in Berlin, South Korea, the Middle East, and Croatia during a twenty-year career as an infantry officer. He also taught history at the U.S. Military Academy and holds a Ph.D. from U.C.L.A. Colonel Raugh is the author of Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship *(London, 1993).*

Book Review
by Mason R. Schaefer

Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command
by Lewis Sorley
University Press of Kansas, 1998, 364 pp., $39.95

When one considers American generals and Vietnam, General William Westmoreland comes to mind. As head of MACV, "Westy" all but personified the American military effort in that country. Less remembered is the Army chief of staff during the peak Vietnam years (1965–68), General Harold K. Johnson. During his command in Vietnam, Westmoreland easily overshadowed his superior officer in the public eye, and Westmoreland himself subsequently assumed the post of chief of staff. As a result, many have overlooked General Johnson's contributions to the American Army. This book attempts to give General Johnson his due, and it largely succeeds. Vietnam proved the poignant climax to that able officer's noteworthy military career.

Lewis Sorley does not lack qualifications for writing such a biography. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has taught at that institution and at the Army War College. Sorley also wrote a biography of General Creighton Abrams and more recently a history of the later years (1969–73) of the Vietnam War.[1] His work on General Johnson is thus part of a personal series on the controversial Vietnam era.

Sorley's highly readable book succinctly covers his subject. He has interviewed hundreds of General Johnson's friends and intimates. The author has also mined much of the recent literature on Vietnam. He maintains a fast pace, no mean feat with a complex military biography. Sorley reveals Harold Johnson the man, not just the general. Born of pioneer stock in Bowesmont, N.D., Johnson matured in farm country and did his share of hard work. These forces formed his character early.

As portrayed by Sorley, Johnson acted with unshakable integrity from boyhood onward. Rigorously honest, he expected others to act as he did. This Sorley sees as a minor flaw. As chief of staff, General Johnson appointed William O.

Wooldridge, a man in whom he fully believed, as the first "sergeant major of the Army." Unfortunately, that worthy then embezzled Army funds; during World War II he had even robbed a pay phone. He embarrassed both the Army and General Johnson. Nevertheless, the post of sergeant major of the Army endures. As we have seen in recent years, however, various seriously flawed men have occasionally filled the position.

General Johnson saw more tragedy and endured more privation than most generals. In 1941–42, for example, he served with the Philippine Scouts in the 57th Infantry. He fought well during the siege of Bataan, only to be taken prisoner by the Japanese. Johnson, then a lieutenant colonel, endured both the Bataan Death March and the pestilential Japanese prison compounds at Camps O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. As soldiers sickened and died around him, Colonel Johnson's inner strength and religious faith sustained his life. After two grisly years in the camps, he then faced a worse ordeal—the hell ships that took thousands of prisoners to camps in Japan. The Japanese crammed hundreds of men into spaces meant for dozens. Ironically, Allied air raids took more lives than bad food and crowding. Bombs hit the prison ships and killed hundreds. Through luck and inner fortitude, Johnson endured this ordeal.

Johnson emerged from World War II a physically broken man. However, he recovered and resumed his Army career. During the Korean War he compiled a brilliant record with the 1st Cavalry Division. In 1960, General Johnson headed the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He excelled both in that post and in subsequent staff positions in Washington. No mere organization man, he took as his motto the phrase "question the assertion." He would not accept the established wisdom at face value, especially in Vietnam. Johnson urged up-and-coming officers to think independently.

Though well liked by his fellow officers and rewarding to work for, General Johnson remained reserved. A devoted husband and father, he showed less affection for his parents and siblings. His letters to them were long, but formal. At an early age, he had moved away from his relatives. "He was the big brother—*period!*" recalled his sister Janet. When he served as Army chief of staff in Washington, his brothers did not visit him. Sorley does not fully explain this aspect of Johnson's character, but one suspects it grew from Johnson's austere upbringing. An exceptional man, he came from a stolid family.

In 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson selected General Johnson as Army chief of staff. He had not expected this promotion and initially found it intimidating. Nonetheless, he threw himself into the job. Vietnam soon dominated his routine. He questioned how Washington and the Pentagon were running the war and the way General Westmoreland conducted operations. To General Johnson, emphasis on body counts and search and destroy missions would lose a "people's war." Before taking office as chief of staff, he had observed several war games that confirmed his thesis. As the PROVN study he commissioned showed, devoting more attention to Vietnamese civil affairs in an effort to win over the people would achieve better results than would bombing and attrition tactics.

Though General Johnson dissented behind the scenes, he did not overturn the system. He gave talks about Vietnam throughout the country. These orations lengthened as the war continued, which made them increasingly painful. He allowed General Westmoreland to sustain his attrition strategy.

Sorley raises many interesting issues, some of which he does not resolve. He explores at length President Johnson's refusal to call up the reserves, which hurt America's conduct of the Vietnam War. The author tantalizes us with rationales. Perhaps Lyndon Johnson feared antagonizing Russia and China; calling the reserves could imply all-out war. He may have tried to appease political allies like Arthur Goldberg, whose seat on the Supreme Court he was preparing to make available to his friend Abe Fortas. (If so, his machinations misfired, as Fortas would resign from the court a few years later under an ethical cloud.) Despite Sorley's lengthy discussion, he does not present a definite thesis on the reserve call-up issue. He leaves the reader dangling.

Using brief paragraphs, Sorley often leapfrogs issues. Some subjects, like Bataan, he covers in gratifying depth. At other times his work waxes episodic. This varies his narrative but can fragment his approach. As he hits one issue after another, the reader may ponder his shifts of emphasis. The book sometimes seems to ramble.

The Vietnam War proved the centerpiece of

General Johnson's career. Nonetheless, Sorley's narrative largely omits that war's campaigns. In a way, that is appropriate. Given the many books on Vietnam combat, more battle stories might seem redundant. However, the reader needs at least minor coverage of the actual actions. One misses the combat zone as Sorley describes General Johnson's many strategic discussions and decisions at the Pentagon, thousands of miles from the front. This approach makes General Johnson seem removed from the war's reality, which he was not. Surely he discussed clashes like Khe Sanh and Operation JUNCTION CITY.

The author enlivens his work with anecdotes, many of which help reveal Johnson's inner character. Sometimes, however, he tells less significant stories. For example, he spins a lengthy tale of Johnson's predecessor at Leavenworth, an officer unaffectionately known as "Splithead." This anecdote distracts from the narrative and would be better relegated to a footnote.

These criticisms aside, Sorley has completed a worthy work on an overlooked figure. After the reader finishes this book, he may feel he knows General Johnson as well as such a reserved man can be known. The book illustrates the tragedy of Vietnam and explores how one officer faced that war's failed strategies. Though Johnson tried to change the Westmoreland approach, he could not. Of course, General Johnson's career involved more than just Vietnam. His conduct in the Philippines and Korea show the potential of the human spirit. Sorley has opened the way to further study of a major figure, while helping to fill an important gap in our understanding of the Vietnam War.

NOTES

1. Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York, 1992), and *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York, 1999).

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Book Review
by David M. Toczek

Light at the End of the Tunnel
A Vietnam War Anthology
edited by Andrew J. Rotter
Revised edition, SR Books, 1999, 440 pp.,
cloth $55, paper $22.95

Vietnam
by Spencer C. Tucker
The University Press of Kentucky, 1999, 244 pp.,
cloth $42, paper, $19

The Second Indochina War still looms large on America's historical horizon, and American historians continue to wrestle with the war's causes and effects. Andrew J. Rotter, in *Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology*, and Spencer C. Tucker, in *Vietnam*, offer their contributions to the field. While differing in focus and scope, each offers insightful views on the Second Indochina War.

Rotter sets as his goal to choose "readings that are diverse, interesting, provocative, and intellectually responsible" (p. xii), and in this he succeeds. He acknowledges that his is not a stand-alone work and encourages instructors to choose supplemental readings. Tucker takes on a greater challenge by attempting to place the Second Indochina War in its historical context. While Americans tend to view the war in terms of the level of American participation, Tucker reminds the reader that "the Vietnam War is regarded by Vietnamese as merely one in a long series of struggles against foreign domination." (p. vii) His discussion of events before and after the Second Indochina War supports his assertion that "Vietnamese history is characterized by two major themes. The first is the effort to preserve the national identity against foreigners. . . . The second theme is territorial expansionism." (p. 1)

Rotter's work is a revised and expanded version of the 1991 edition. Intended as a text for undergraduates, it is similar in purpose and scope to Robert J. MacMahon's *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War:Documents and Essays* (Lexington, Mass., 1990). Tucker's *Vietnam* resembles George Herring's *America's Longest War* (3d ed., New York, 1996) and James Olson and Randy Roberts's *Where*

the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1995 (rev. 3d ed., Saint James, N.Y., 1999). Tucker's scope, however, is broader than that of these other works, as he dedicates an entire chapter to Vietnamese history before the arrival of the French and another to the French occupation and administration of Indochina. Nevertheless, neither Rotter nor Tucker offers a drastically revised view of the issues in question.

The two books are organized to support their individual objectives. *Light at the End of the Tunnel* employs both a chronological and a topical approach to the material. Rotter divides his Part I, "A Chronology of U.S. Intervention," into four periods: 1945–52, 1953–61, 1961–68, and 1968–75. Part II, "In Country," looks at three issues: "The American Enemy," "The Battlefield," and "The Military." In the last part of the work, "Controversies and Consequences of American Involvement," Rotter examines "Laos and Cambodia," "Interpreting the War," "The War at Home," and "The Legacy of the War." Rotter's selections fit his subjects well. Tucker's *Vietnam* is organized as a straightforward chronological narrative, which ambitiously spans the years 2879 B.C. to 1997 A.D. However, the Second Indochina War is the focus of the book.

Each work reflects both older and more recent scholarship and writing. Rotter presents both primary accounts and authoritative secondary works to provide the reader with a broad view of the war's immediate antecedents, the war itself, and its aftermath. Tucker also draws upon a broad expanse of primary and secondary literature on his topic. Not content with English sources alone, Tucker also uses French materials written by both French and Vietnamese. For all their attempts at providing a balanced view of the war, however, both works lack original North and South Vietnamese sources. While *Vietnam* does utilize some Vietnamese works that have been translated into English and one Vietnamese work that has not, it overlooks other sources that might contribute depth to the discussion.

For all these works' strengths, there are a number of weaknesses that deserve mention. In *Light at the End of the Tunnel*, the editor provides the words of conservative and liberal, war advocate and war protester, soldier and civilian alike. While offering various perspectives on certain issues, in many cases he does not offer opposing views of the same topic, leaving the reader to determine on his or her own what the opposing position would be. His introductory comments for certain chapters at times tend to overstate his case. For example, he suggests that "Kennedy's most momentous decision was to send *waves* of Special Forces to train and support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam [emphasis added]." (p. 65) While Kennedy did dramatically increase the number of American advisers in Vietnam, both officially and unofficially, most of the advisers were not members of the Special Forces.

Vietnam is not without its faults, either. Tucker draws heavily from the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1998), of which he was the editor. While that in itself might not be a problem, the authors of the encyclopedia's entries sometimes do not provide the most objective treatment of the topics at hand. Thus in characterizing Creighton Abrams' view of pacification, Tucker writes that "General Abrams dramatically changed the military emphasis from search and destroy tactics and body counts to pacification. He believed that population security was the key to winning the war and that all military operations should be built around this goal." (p. 150) Upon closer inspection, however, one finds that Tucker's information on this matter comes from the encyclopedia's entry on Abrams authored by Lewis

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The U.S. Army Center of Military History is continuing to seek volunteers interested in assisting with the work of the Center. Volunteers may participate in the preparation and organization of library and archival materials and in providing information to the public. The volunteer work will be conducted at the Center's primary location at 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. Nearby on-post parking is normally available. Interested individuals should provide a *vita*, together with their address and telephone number, to Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058. Further information may be obtained from Dr. Clarke at (202) 685-2709.

Sorley, an unabashed Abrams devotee. Tucker's characterization clearly contradicts the realities of Abrams' early years as commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. One need only remember that the battle of Dong Ap Bia, also known as Hamburger Hill, took place in May 1969, about a year after Abrams' assumption of command. Readers should also be aware that Tucker relies upon British spelling and punctuation standards for his text, perhaps because the College of London Press also published this work. While both books have their shortcomings, they do not materially affect what the authors set out to do.

Although historians rarely agree on how influential the Second Indochina War has been in shaping world events, most will concede that it remains a topic of historical interest and debate. Two recent works, Andrew Rotter's *Light at the End of the Tunnel* and Spencer Tucker's *Vietnam*, contribute to the body of literature concerning this war, and both accomplish that task in their own way. While geared toward the undergraduate, these books deserve a place on any twentieth-century historian's bookshelf.

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Book Review
by Lee T. Wyatt III

Other Leaders, Other Heroes: West Point's Legacy to America beyond the Field of Battle
by James R. Endler
Praeger, 1998, 229 pp., $35.00

James Endler has written an informative account of the rich and varied contributions that United States Military Academy graduates have made over the past two centuries in a remarkable number of fields and endeavors, many far removed from the more familiar military or political arenas that were served by Lee, Grant, Pershing, MacArthur, Patton, Bradley, Eisenhower, and Schwarzkopf. These "other leaders, other heroes," however, represent to no less a degree the common tradition of leadership and success associated with the ideals and mission of the Military Academy. Indeed, even the reader with more than a passing knowledge of West Point cannot help but be impressed by the sheer breadth and depth of the accomplishments of Endler's subjects. These persons have touched the very fabric of the nation, perhaps more so than graduates of any other institution of higher learning in the country. This understanding is the true value of Endler's work. It underscores the fact that the lives of "ordinary" West Point graduates have in a real sense constructed the saga of the United States, as the academy's history and lineage coincides so closely with the birth, growth, and maturity of the American miracle.

Mr. Endler has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to research his subject in exhausting detail. The personal and anecdotal information that he relates provides the reader with a colorful narrative of the changing landscape of American culture. As such, he divides his work into two parts, each with specific categories such as "Pathfinders" and "Statesmen and National Leaders," that chronicle the progress of the country in its first two centuries and the Military Academy's corresponding role in helping to shape its direction. This organization seems at first glance to be a logical one, and the author apologizes in his preface for any "worthy deeds of some graduates" that he may have failed to recognize. Yet, despite the disclaimer, this approach also has its flaws. The large number of graduates cited and detail provided in some categories have the tendency to overwhelm the reader on occasion, while the more limited accounts in other sections raise doubts about their inclusion in the first place. Thus Part I, "The First Century," is heavily weighted toward West Point graduates who, as engineers, opened and subdued the American continent for future expansion and settlement. While no one can deny the remarkable courage and achievements of these individuals who confronted an environment that was hostile on many levels, this emphasis contrasts with a cursory treatment of the category of "Professions." This methodology recurs in Part II, which Endler closes with a lengthy discussion of "The Public Servants" category, after stressing less the contributions of such other professional groups as "Educators."

There are several other areas in which some reorganization might have better captured the author's intent. The section entitled "A Century Requiring Change" (pp. 109–11) should in reality be the intro-

duction to Part II. It primarily summarizes the changes that West Point witnessed in its second century and thus should have been separated from the discussion of the academy's first century in Part I. The last chapter mixes the past and present in a somewhat incoherent fashion. It might have been more effective to move a large portion of this chapter into an introduction to the entire work to provide the general reader some historical and contemporary context regarding the Military Academy prior to the trumpet call of persons and events that follows.

Surprisingly, Endler omits one important category of graduates altogether. These are the foreign officers who have completed the four-year West Point curriculum and returned to their native countries. The foreign cadet program has been in operation for over a century. At present, the nearly three dozen foreign cadets in residence at the academy are nominated for a West Point appointment by their respective nations through State Department channels. Over the years, these cadets have distinguished themselves not merely as military officers but in a number of other roles for their countries as well. As the Military Academy instructs these foreign cadets, it inculcates the institution's values into future leaders of nations allied to the United States, while the students' cadet experiences forge personal relationships that might bear fruit in some future conflict.

Despite these organizational issues and omissions, which are for the most part a result of the very nature of the topic, Endler's book does accomplish its essential purpose. Unlike other authors who have written on the Military Academy, Endler does not let events provide the structure into which he places the personalities he examines. Rather, he allows the biographies of his subjects to be central, thus heightening the reader's awareness of their role at crucial points in American history. The picture that Endler paints is one of an institution that through a careful balance of a technical and liberal education has prepared West Point's sons and daughters over nearly two centuries for successful careers in business, industry, education, the arts, athletics, and public service, following their military obligation. The reader quickly realizes that the academy is the ultimate leadership laboratory that does indeed inspire its graduates to a lifetime of service to the nation. It would indeed be inconceivable for the country to have achieved so much without the vision, energy, and determination of the thousands of members of the "long gray line."

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